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Managing Issues And Influencing Public Policy

Modern planners, influenced by recent developments in "strategic management," know that affirmative action about matters of public policy can be a key to organizational prosperity. The authors of this article explore three major topics: first, basic misunderstandings about issue management and policy influence; second, the process which can be called the management of an issue's "status"; and third, the presentation of a "catalytic" model of issue management and policy influence.

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More than five years ago, Barrie L. Jones and W. Howard Chase presented a process model of "issue management" and concluded that:

In our pluralistic society, public policy is the result of interaction between public and private points of view. The corporation, as an institution, has every moral and legal right to participate in formation of public policy—not merely to react, or be responsive, to policies designed by government.¹

To this day, their rationale for corporate input into public policy remains valid; their concern for a systematic approach to that input remains justified; and their model retains a certain precision and applicability.

In fact, what also may be said is that Jones and Chase's original concerns are an ever-increasing focus for modern organizations. Modern planners, influenced by recent developments in "strategic management," know that affirmative action about matters of public policy can be a key to organizational prosperity. When issues are "ready for decision,"² organizational response can be crucial. This article, though, deals with an even more aggressive and potentially productive approach to public policy concerns. The goal is to aid organizational planners who are attempting to do what 1980's organizations demand of them: to generate and nurture issues until they result in favorable public policy.

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More specifically, the present essay explores three major topics: first, basic misunderstandings about issue management and policy influence; second, the process which can be called the management of an issue's "status;" and third, the presentation of a "catalytic" model of issue management and policy influence. The sequential discussion of these topics will help organizational planners understand—and perform—the tasks before them.

Organizational planners can perform their tasks better in light of clear conceptions of what those tasks actually involve. Unfortunately, there are at least two points of general misunderstanding about the relationship between public policy and issue management: the difference between authority and influence in policy matters and the distinction between "issues" and "policies."

The Jones and Chase approach to issue management can be criticized legitimately for the lack of specificity concerning *power* in public policy formation. They claim that, "Within the public policy process are three decision-making groups: citizens, business, and government. No one of these groups makes policy decision independently."³ The conclusion is accurate, but the implication is misleading. It is the case that public policy is determined by an interplay of forces—including "citizens" and "business." It is not the case that these agents of power are co-equal. Regardless of how sociological the contemporary scene has become, the actual *authority* over public policy rests where it has for more than two hundred years—in the halls of government. In contemporary times, the Congress awaits "legislative packages" from the executive branch. The Congress ruminates and eventually decides policy matters, always subject to judicial review. At lower levels of government—state and local—the process remains the same. Exceptions occur only when the executive branch or the judiciary makes decisions which seem to (or do) have the impact of law.

What is clear is that "citizens" and "business" have no co-equal *authority*. What they *do* have is *influence*, and that influence affects dramatically the *authority* of government to do its work. *Power* is not at issue here, because citizens, business, and the government all have their power—pragmatic, even if unformalized. What is at issue is *authority*, and authority resides where it always has: with the people who propound philosophies, establish guidelines, enact laws. In contrast to Jones and Chase's perspective, "government"—unlike the other two forces—does "make" the laws, simply because it has the authority to do so. The task of citizens and business is not to "make" the policies, but to influence them. The distinction is not trivial. Organizations, having no "authority" over public policy, are limited to exerting "influence" over policies enacted by those who do have the authority. This influence, as defined here, is why "issue management" has importance: Issue management can permit an organization, with *no actual authority*, to *influence* public policy.

Jones and Chase make a distinction between “issues” and “trends,” and define an issue as an “unsettled matter which is ready for decision.”⁴ The difference between trends and issues is important, but it is no more important than the distinction between issues and policies. Clearly, these two concepts are not the same. We may agree that an issue is an “unsettled matter”—a question—but it is not necessarily “ready for decision.” Moreover, an issue is not the same as a policy.

The Nature of Issues

Issues are not simply questions that exist. An issue is created when one or more human agents attaches significance to a situation or perceived “problem.” These interested agents create or recreate arguments which they feel will be acceptable *resolutions* to questions about the *status quo*.⁵ Literally, then, people and groups of people “make” issues out of matters in which they have an interest. Moreover, issues—while derived from “problems”—are not exactly problems. They are situations in which relief but not total solution is found. Said another way, issues may be “resolved”—in the sense of a temporary “answer”—but they are never “solved” in the sense of a final answer. This difference explains why “what to do about litter” may have temporary answers, but the question never seems destined for death. In a phrase, issues become “resolved,” but never “solved” once-and-for-all.

While all questions in need of resolution may be termed “issues,” the level of importance or attention attached to or directed at a given issue clearly varies. Not all issues are perceived as equally important by judges in the court of public opinion; the standing or importance that an issue holds for that judging public reflects the “status” of the issue.

To determine the status of something is to resolve its standing, relative to other possible choices.⁶ A “high-status” car, for example, is only such a thing when one is interested in cars, generally, and when one considers automotive distinctiveness a matter in need of resolution. The same is true for issues. Issues have various levels of status or importance for possible receivers. It is the task of the issue manager to understand the “perceived” level of status that the issue holds for important publics and to move judges toward the “desired” level of status by communicative intervention.

The various interpretations of “status” not only augment the Jones-Chase discussion; they also add to the understanding of issues and public policy generally. Issues-as-questions, it seems, have a “life cycle” as they are examined and reacted to by agents with public policy influence. A stage in those life cycles is perceived as a “status” of that issue. Organizational planners and strategies can benefit from understanding the five basic levels of issue status.

An issue may be thought to have *potential status*, a first level of importance, when some person or group demonstrates its *interest* in the issue. First, they formulate the possible variations of resolution into systematic

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and recurring questions such as, "Should not something be done about X?" Second, these interested persons gather *arguments* which support their interpretation of the scope of the problem; they hone their interest into arguments such as "This issue involves X, not Y." Finally these interested, directed people create a supported, defensible, *justified answer* to their own questions: "We think X ought to be done." Virtually anyone can "give" potential status to an issue by formulating a question, setting boundaries, and proposing an answer. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that more than a handful of others will take note of the issue: People must see how the issue relates to or affects them and their concerns.

An issue can have *imminent* status, a second stage, only if the "potential" of the issue has been accepted by others. Typically, this involves the *endorsement* by some person or group of the issue-as-presented (opinion leaders, the president, Ralph Nader, the UAW, etc.); the *legitimation* of the issue based on historical tradition, American values, etc.; and significant people or publics seeing the *linkages* between themselves and others interested in the issue. At this stage, the issue is growing in power. People are beginning to see connections between themselves and others; they perceive that the issue is "coming together" or "picking up steam." But the issue still may not be perceived as important by organizational leaders, citizens in general, or governmental leaders.

A third status of issues can be termed *current* status. The term has two meanings: First, the issue is of current or present interest, and second, the issue has become a means of exchange—an "honored" or "accepted" topic of conversation and concern—a "currency." An issue of current status evolves when (1) sources with widespread communication contacts (usually the mass media) are disseminating information; (2) the "coverage" of the issue has tended to dichotomize and dramatize the "sides" of or choices in the issue; and (3) "various public participants" choose to play or are chosen to play roles in the circulated drama.⁷ An issue with current status is one which can be spent or purchased readily as part of the social agenda; its widespread distribution, due to the intervention of (usually) popular media, makes it known to (or "honored" by) increasingly greater, but more remote, publics.

At the fourth status, the issue becomes *critical* when people or groups of people *identify* with some side of the issue.⁸ They accept as important the arguments "for" their preferred position, and they actively are concerned that, in fact, *some* resolution (hopefully theirs) is found or chosen. *Critical* issues, then, are at a moment of decision—a crisis, in the sense that something is willed (and predicted) to happen. Some policy decision is demanded.

There is, though, a final issue stage or status: *Dormant* issues are issues which have been dealt with in some way—either by talking, or acting or both. What has happened is that the issue has been "resolved" and widely is presumed to be dead. The label "dormant" is used here because, again, public issues seem never to die. With most people satisfied that the problem

has been solved and the question answered, the issue lies quietly—not dead, but sleeping—until the issue is given new life by people who see new problems in the new situations.

In essence, the *dormancy* of a resolved issue can be disturbed when someone—at a later time, under new circumstances—sees the *potential* of the issue again. Of equal importance is that an issue may become “dormant” at earlier stages of the process: An issue may fail to garner the endorsement of significant groups or people, and fall from the status of potential to dormant; an issue may become imminent, but fail to attract the attention of disseminators (it “drops” from imminent to dormant); or, an issue may become so complex that, even if it reaches current status, it falls to dormancy without being resolved. In each of these cases, the issue awaits human agents to perceive the potential of the issue. If that time occurs, the cycle of the issue’s status may begin anew.

Issues and Policies

On the basis of the discussion just completed, the distinction between issues and policies can be clarified. From the status of potential, to imminent, to current, to critical, to dormant, *issues remain issues: only the status changes*. In contrast, policies are formulated answers to the questions made into issues. What this means is that “policy discussions” only involve *current* and *critical* stages in the life of an issue. An issue with current status involves the widespread dissemination of the dichotomized answers to the question; these are policy-proposals that become central to the policy formation process. When issues reach critical status, the demand is that one or another approach, philosophy, or bill be accepted as an answer; these are actual policies, at least one of which eventually may be selected. It is only at this “critical” point that issues are, as Jones and Chase said about issues in general, “ready for decision.” Failure to distinguish the status of an issue at which a decision is “ready” amounts to failing to distinguish between issues and policies.

Issue management, therefore, involves attention to issues at any level of importance or “status.” *Policy management* awaits the formulation of the answers to current and critical issues. Modern planners must be involved in both issue management and policy influence but they should know which they are doing. Issue management is a fundamental way of influencing policies before they become policies.

To understand fully the role of issue management in the eventual influence on policy, planners and executives should understand two basic ideas: first, the relationship between issue status and what Jones and Chase call “change strategies”; and second, the importance of what we shall call the “catalytic” change strategy.

Jones and Chase delineated three basic methods for dealing with environmental changes.⁹ In simplified terms, they include:

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- *reactive strategy*—in which organizations yearn for the better days of the past and attempt to “ride out” the developments occurring around them;

- *adaptive strategy*—in which organizations attempt to be open to and adjust to changes; faced with potentially undesirable actions, policies, or laws, organizations may attempt to compromise or propose alternatives; and

- *dynamic strategy*—in which organizations attempt to anticipate changes and perhaps even initiate projects, policies, etc. which are desirable—or at least more desirable than other possibilities.

Jones and Chase clearly advocate the assumption of the dynamic strategy whenever possible; it helps, they say, determine “the theatre of war, the weapons to be used, and the timing of the battle itself.”¹⁰

These various strategies for dealing with change can be reinterpreted on the basis of the preceding discussion of “issue status” with interesting results. Organizations utilizing the reactive approach wait until an issue reaches *critical* status, at which point a decision is *demanded*. And then, they await whatever will be the effects of the newly chosen policy. Using the adaptive strategy, organizations still wait until an issue is at a *current*—perhaps even *critical*—status, and then they may *support alternatives* or create “a climate of opinion receptive to alternative solutions.”¹¹ Yet, even the dynamic approach as described waits until issues have reached at least imminent or even *current* status. With this strategy, organizations study trends and attempt to “anticipate” the actions of others. Original solutions or policy suggestions may be offered, but note that these are assumed to be made simply to avoid the predicted policy-suggestions of other forces. In a word, each of the change strategies discussed by Jones and Chase is *defensive* in nature.

Said in another way, all three strategies are responses to agenda-setting by others. Issues have reached the point or level of status at which policy proposals and alternatives obviously will be presented for decision, are being disseminated, or are being acted on. Though decisions have not been made, the decisions are on the agenda.

How this agenda-setting is accomplished is not clear from the discussion by Jones and Chase. At one point, they cite McCombs’ analysis and contend, “The mass media do not tell people what to think; they tell people what to think about.”¹² Yet earlier, Jones and Chase had argued that, “Activist groups most often set the public policy agenda . . .”¹³ The answer to the apparent contradiction seems to be this: While the media may function as principal “agenda-setters,” it has been activist groups which have been some of the most skillful attractors of media attention. The attention paid to such groups by the media results in “coverage,” “agenda-setting” and the issues being raised to current status. Activist groups cannot “agenda-set” any more than others, but they can function as “agenda-stimuli” just as others can.

Returning to the analysis of issue status, then, at the *potential* status, people are interested in justifying something as an issue; at the *imminent* status, the potential issue is given reinforcement, support, and endorsement by significant others. Efforts then begin to attract the attention of the media and similar disseminators of ideas. When the issue becomes *current*, it has reached—and only then reached—the public “agenda.”

The essential point here is that Jones and Chase’s three change strategies wait until others have engaged in “agenda-stimulation” before issue management is considered important. The corollaries are these:

- Organizations do not have to wait so long to engage in issue management;
- Issue management can influence “policies” long before policy options are created by others.

The “Catalytic” Strategy of Change

The rationale for specifying a fourth change strategy to Jones and Chase’s three rests on three ideas, all of which lead to a conclusion of great importance to organizational planners: First, *even the “dynamic” strategy is defensive and negative.*¹⁴ Such a strategy suggests that organizations be either against a proposed change seen as undesirable, or for a solution as a way of “heading off” predicted undesirable alternatives. Jones and Chase’s examples support the conclusions just mentioned.

Second, though, even the “dynamic” strategy proposes—at best—the analysis of “trends” which point the way to likely events. The emphasis is on what is *feared in the future* and what the environment seems about to offer.

Third, even the “dynamic” strategy assumes that the “public agenda” *has been set or is about to be set*, so action is necessary or at least desirable. All these ideas lead to a crucial conclusion: *Even the “dynamic” strategy does not begin soon enough in the issue management process. Organizational planners and executives seeking to succeed in the policy forum, we suggest, cannot afford to wait until others have defined and legitimized issues before entering the issue arena.*

As an alternative, even to the “dynamic” strategy, we propose a fourth strategy which we shall label the “catalytic” strategy. What we wish to imply in the name is that the organization does not wait for things to happen around it; it does not wait until issues become critical, current, or imminent. Instead, the “catalytic” strategy, as implied in the term borrowed from the natural sciences, aims at prompting or making things happen; it “urges” organizations to take the offensive (not the defensive) and to engage in affirmative (not negative) action. Returning to our critique of “even the dynamic strategy,” let us explain the catalytic approach.

In contrast even with the “dynamic” strategy, the catalytic strategy begins earlier in the issue management process. Turning to specifics: First, trends in the environment are not the first consideration; what the organization

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desires to become or have is primary. The organization continually needs to assess what it is, what it wants to be, and how the environment could be altered to the advantage of the organization (which still seeks to be a responsible part of society). Lesly, for instance, has advised that, in general, "Companies must be alerted for opportunities to create a more favorable climate at the same time as they continue to combat threats or issues."¹⁵ Second, what is already on the public agenda obviously is of concern, but what the organization would wish to see on the agenda is more important in long-range planning. "What the organization would like to see happen" becomes a list of the ideal public agenda; organizational desires come to be seen as public policy "wish lists." So, third, instead of reacting only to the agenda already set (and, as we have seen, in negative ways), the organization looks toward strategies of what we called earlier "agenda-stimulation." The "catalytic" strategy, then, begins with organizational desires—not reactions—and moves toward eventual agenda-setting by the mass media.

Lest all this should seem purely theoretical and unobtainable, one must remember what Jones and Chase said of "activist groups"—or, at least our interpretation of the thrust of their idea. Activist groups have *stimulated* the agenda-setting process simply because these groups have determined what changes they would like to see in the realm of public policy. These groups have had no special power. They have analyzed their goals and wishes, formulated (potential) issues, sought the (imminent) legitimation of issues, and attempted to capture the (current) attention of the media and key public "judges." There is no magic here. What has been demonstrated, in contrast to magic, is an awareness that "issue management" begins far earlier than even Jones and Chase's "dynamic" strategy would lead one to believe. What activist groups have been doing for years is precisely what organizations need to do to survive most beneficially in the mid-1980s: they need to adopt a "catalytic" strategy toward change.¹⁶ The strategy is not a reaction of any kind—except to the goals of the organization. The strategy is offensive in the best strategic sense of the word, and the strategy is affirmative, rather than negative: It seeks to create policy opportunities, rather than to defeat trends or policies which seem undesirable.


The Catalytic Issue Management Model

The most aggressive of Jones and Chase's strategies, the dynamic, still relies on reactions to the issue management of others. The catalytic approach, in contrast, is offered as an approach to be used by organizations in their long-term issue management. Organizations wishing to initiate, rather than react to, policy discussions can be guided by this model (see Figure 1).

The practicality of the model becomes apparent when its thrust is made clear. The goal of the catalytic approach is to create what we have called potential issues, to help them become imminent issues, and to enhance the chances of their becoming current and critical issues. *The goal, that is, is to*

Figure 1

The Catalytic Model of Issue Management



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take an issue through its life cycle so that it is resolved in directions favorable to the organization.

To pursue that goal, the organization's first task is *situation assessment*. Assessing the situation means that the organization must look both at itself and its environment. This *organizational assessment*, the first step, involves attention to the profit motive (if for-profit) or the survival motive (if not-for-profit). But it also involves comparison between the more specific goals or desires of the organization and the resources it has at its disposal. Even at this point in the process, employee involvement may be crucial as a human resource, a source of ideas about goals, and as a source of ultimate support. Note that the wishes or desires are not oriented toward the defensive; they are not hopes that something can be avoided. They are positive indices of events or factors which the organization hopes to experience.

These goals, then, are assessed in terms of the realities of the environment. The emphasis here is not on trends, because trends imply an already evolving situation. The emphasis is on the existing conditions (social, political, economic, etc.) and how these conditions imply both possibilities and constraints. The possibilities involve potential goals; the constraints involve problems in reaching those goals. In balancing goal-possibilities against constraints, the organization may decide that certain aspects of the situation should be influenced. The organization may decide to initiate attempts at change—a decision which leads to the second step of the model.

In the *goal-establishment* phase of the model, organizational planners begin translating desires into goals. To accomplish that, they *define the nature of the change* they wish to have occur. That change might be "policy" in any of its ramifications: new law, new government "guidelines," new regulatory concepts, new administrative practices or interpretations. Next, planners *consider the impact of such changes*. Typical questions include: What are the most likely effects of such changes on organizational operations? What are the most likely effects on the organization's operating environment? How significant are the predictable positive effects? How significant are the predictable negative outcomes? If predicted positive outcomes far outweigh the predicted negatives, organizational planners next attempt to *determine what role the organization could play in "catalyzing" the desired change*. Some matters of "policy" are determined by court interpretation or other procedures in which organization can have no influence. Some changes may be so basically unpopular—ending the regulation of monopoly, for instance—that the organization can have no realistic hope of spurring change. At other times, of course, changes may be realistic, the policy process may be open to non-governmental influence, and changes can indeed be initiated.

Goal-establishing also means the comparison of the potential goal to available resources, including time, money, and staff. Even highly desirable and completely feasible goals may need to be abandoned in the embryonic stage unless the required efforts are *cost-justifiable*. The expense of long-term policy influence need not be justified on short-term gains, but such

efforts are still a part of the operational expenses and they ultimately must be worth their expense. Even in the short-term, organizations cannot use resources they do not have—even if the longer-term benefits would justify it.

On the basis of all these considerations, the organization may *decide to act as a catalyst* for affirmative change. The goal becomes to initiate policy. This, of course, cannot be done *directly* by groups without policy authority, but it can be done *indirectly* by groups with policy influence. In essence, organizations wishing to catalyze policy processes begin to manage the “creation” of an issue; they begin to help boost an issue through each status of its life cycle.

As the model indicates, an organization can begin to demonstrate what we have called the issue’s potential. This is where the situation is perceived as a question to be resolved. The scope of the question is “justified” and arguments are created and presented; the organization begins to involve its various internal publics; and both community relations and governmental relations activities become important. The goal is to move the issue from potential status to imminent status, and that is accomplished by gaining endorsements from significant others, legitimizing the issue, and creating linkages between various publics and the new issue. In this process, publics are targeted and communication decisions are made concerning:

- *path* of influence (directly to law-makers by lobbying, through direct appeals to the public, through court suits, etc.)
- *media* (letters, magazine/newspaper ads, personal contacts, speeches, etc.)
- *forms* (style, character, format; “editorial” style, direct persuasive appeal, appeal by implication)
- *tactics* (specific argumentative and persuasive tactics)

Clearly, all these choices must be made in a coordinated manner. To move an issue from potential status to imminence would require a well-orchestrated communication effort. All organizational members, whether involved in internal enlistment, governmental relations, or community relations, must understand their communicative roles *vis-à-vis* the overall goal.

If organizations fail in their efforts at this stage, the issue may recede from potential status to dormant status. If, on the other hand, the organization is successful in gaining endorsements, establishing linkages, and legitimizing the issue, the issue can be perceived as imminent.

As the model indicates, issues which are imminent require the continuation or organizational efforts already discussed. Since the goal at this stage is to move the issue from imminent status to current status, media relations become crucial. If the issue is to achieve widespread currency, media coverage must be sought and gained. Issue positions must be presented as “newsworthy,” and organizational efforts should have the charm of attractive policy potential instead of an aura of self-centeredness. Positions which are innovative, dramatically presented, and well-defended are

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needed. To help the entire process of dissemination, direct issue advocacy can be helpful both as a means of "spreading the word" and as a means of inviting media coverage. By understanding the media's customary and institutional attraction to drama, polarized alternatives, "heroes" and "villains," and stories of conflict, the catalytic issue manager can portray the organization in socially active and coverage-amenable ways. At this stage, the organization is engaged in agenda-stimulation. It utilizes issue advocacy and media relations as a means of helping its issue find a place on the public agenda.

If the organization fails to accomplish its goal of agenda-stimulation, the issue may recede from imminent status to dormant status or at least the status of potential issue. If the organization is successful, however, the issue becomes a part of the public agenda: the issue finally will become a matter of alternative answers to a now-familiar question. It is at this stage that we may talk of policy management instead of issue management. As the model indicates, this also is the stage at which generally available discussions of "corporate advocacy" or "issue advocacy" become practical—and crucial. The issue, generated and nurtured by the organization, becomes subject to the argumentation and persuasion of all those holders of (not *authority over*, but) *influence in public policy*.

Conclusion

To appreciate fully the importance of the catalytic approach to issue management and policy influence, it has been necessary to realize anew the modern organization's potential role in public policy formation. On the other hand, to comprehend fully the catalytic approach, it has been advisable to discuss three major topics.

First, we looked at some basic misunderstandings—or, at least, apparent misunderstandings—about issue management and policy influence. We examined the critical, but often-overlooked, distinction between authority and influence in public policy matters. This became even more important when we surveyed the difference between issues and policies: Organizations are limited to *influencing* policies; they can *manage* issues. Here we reexamined the nature of issues and developed an analysis of the "status" of issues. These discussions allowed us, finally, to discriminate between issues and policies in ways helpful to the corporate planner.

We turned attention, then, to the management of—not issues, but—issue "status." We re-analyzed Jones and Chase's discussion of "change strategies" based on our analysis of issue status. Finally, here, we juxtaposed these other change strategies to what we have called the "catalytic" approach. In describing it, we isolated reasons for the choice of this change strategy over others—even the dynamic.

Finally, we presented and described what modern planners—particularly those interested in "strategic management"—need to know: how to "pro-

gram" the catalytic approach. We presented and described the basic strategy "moves," sources of support, and the role that basic line and staff functions can play in operationalizing the catalytic approach to issue management and policy influence.

What has been discussed is not a magical elixir for all the trials of a modern organization. Clearly, the organization will confront situations and issues which were not anticipated and for which they are not prepared. But the discussion of public policy should not concern only the unexpected. Modern organizations indeed can engage in long-term planning; they can stop simply waiting for the development of trends; they, in effect, can take an aggressive and affirmative approach to policy concerns. They themselves can stimulate the public agenda. They can adopt, that is, a *catalytic* approach to issue management and policy influence.

References

¹Barrie L. Jones and W. Howard Chase, "Managing Public Policy Issues," *Public Relations Review* 2 (1979), p. 7. In much of the literature, "issues management" is used, but we prefer to adopt the term as used in the Chase/Jones model.

²*Ibid.*, p. 11.

³*Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁵Several writers have noted that political issues are resolvable-but-not-solvable. W. Lance Bennett, citing Bertrand de Jouvenal, holds that "the essence of a political issue is that . . . it can not be resolved." Jouvenal holds that a political problem's "terms admit no solution properly called." The terminologies, not the positions, are inconsistent. There is a difference between a problem which is unsolvable (in final and unchallengeable ways) and one which is resolvable because of what Ellul terms "an accommodation" between the clashing terminologies. Our position is that conflicting issue positions cannot be solved finally, but can be resolved terminologically—and thus will continue to be argued. *Re-solution* provides the necessary accommodation for getting things done, without necessarily doing so once and for all. See W. Lance Bennett, "Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 8 (1973), p. 27; Bertrand de Jouvenal, *The Pure Theory of Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 207; and Jacques Ellul, *The Political Illusion* (New York: Vintage, 1967), p. 190.

⁶See entry for "status" in *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 3029. The term status is related to "stasis" as a description of "standing."

⁷For a general discussion of institutional perspectives on television news and its dramatizing tendencies, see Edward Jay Epstein, *News From Nowhere* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 4-5.

⁸Footnote withheld to insure anonymity.

⁹Jones and Chase, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

¹⁰Jones and Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹¹Jones and Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹²Jones and Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹³Jones and Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁴Philip Lesly has argued that "Issues are negative; they involve a defensive posture." See *Managing the Human Climate* (September-October, 1980), p. 4. In our complementary analysis, what seems clear is that chosen strategies create the posture of defensiveness and negativism.

¹⁵Philip Lesly, "Functioning in the New Human Climate," *Management Review* (December 1981), p. 27.

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¹⁶Once again, Lesly provides reinforcement. See *Managing the Human Climate* (November–December, 1981), pp. 1–2 and *Overcoming Opposition* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 62–63. Lesly's work, cited in the last three footnotes, is recommended as background reading although our conclusions and analyses were arrived at independently.



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